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The Case for International Emission Trade in the Absence of Cooperative
Climate Policy
Abstract
We evaluate the eﬃcacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries
are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general
equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that
guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation
in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made noncooperatively; so
a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement
agreements or that participation will result in signiﬁcant environmental gains. Despite this,
we ﬁnd that emission trade agreements can be eﬀective; that smaller groupings pairing
developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger
rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these
outcomes.
Keywords: global warming, coalitions, general equilibrium, tradable permits.
JEL classiﬁcation: D7, F18, F42, Q58.
1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol has achieved little in terms of global emission reductions. Current negotia-
tions of a Post-Kyoto agreement suggest that for most countries national self-interest constitutes
a dominant guiding principle. This perception is conﬁrmed by a poll among climate policy ex-
perts, who anticipate only modest reductions in global emissions for the year 2020 (Böhringer
and Löschel 2005). In a nutshell, there is little hope at the moment that countries adopt coopera-
tive strategies and make substantial voluntary contributions to the global public good of climate
protection. In this paper we argue that even in a world where countries only pursue their na-
tional self-interest, an international system of tradable emission permits can achieve substantial
emission reductions.
A well known eﬀect of permit trading is that it makes meeting a given abatement target less
costly. This should reduce emissions. It is less obvious that permit trade will produce emission
reductions when countries are free to choose their endowment of emission rights. Countries face
a number of diﬀerent incentives in making this choice. First, countries with a low willingness to
pay (WTP) for emission reductions have an incentive to choose more emission rights when these
are tradable because they can sell them with little concern for the associated increase in global
emissions. In contrast, high WTP countries beneﬁt from the possibility to buy cheap abatement
opportunities in other countries, giving them the incentive to choose less emission rights. Second,
countries may strategically alter the size of their endowments to aﬀect the permit price. This gives
permit exporters an incentive to increase their scarcity and importers an incentive to increase
their abundance. Finally, countries also have an incentive to use their choice of emission rights
as a substitute for trade policy  to impact markets for other tradable goods, such as energy-
intensive goods and fossil fuels. The net eﬀect of these choices on global emissions depends on
the proﬁles of regional economies and the roster of countries that are included in permit trade.
We ﬁnd that certain groupings of countries that exploit these incentives can be quite eﬀective in
producing emission reductions.
Determining what characteristics of permit-trade agreements make them eﬀective and what
magnitude of emission reductions they are capable of producing are fundamentally empirical
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issues. To address them, we construct a numerical model which embeds strategic behavior in the
design of national abatement policies within a computable general equilibrium (CGE) description
of the world economy. The CGE model provides a basis for describing the proﬁles of the diﬀerent
world regions which are players in our permit-trade game and allows us to describe how trade
linkages impact permit-trade agreements.
In the model, agreements are equilibria in which both a country's decision to participate in
an agreement and its decision regarding the size of its permit endowment are best responses to
the actions of other countries. A proposal which speciﬁes the potential members of a permit
trade agreement is put forward. The proposal is taken as given. In stage 1, potential agreement
members simultaneously decide whether they agree to participate in the proposed trading regime.
In stage 2, all countries simultaneously choose their allocation of emission rights. Firms located
in member countries trade emission rights with ﬁrms in other member countries. Firms in non-
member countries trade emission rights only on domestic markets. Markets, which are assumed
to be competitive, clear and payoﬀs accrue. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this
game, no country wants to unilaterally change its choice of emission rights nor its decision about
participation in the trading system. By enumerating the possible agreement memberships we
are able to illustrate which pairings of countries might be most eﬀective in reducing emissions.
There is a substantial literature that uses game-theoretic concepts to analyze self-enforcing
international environmental agreements (often called IEAs or coalitions).1 While there are
similarities between the models presented in these studies and the one here, there are important
conceptual diﬀerences. Broadly speaking, authors in the self-enforcing IEA literature seek to
provide a general description of the degree to which countries will voluntarily internalize pollution
externalities. In keeping with this focus, they abstract from the speciﬁc instruments used to aﬀect
emission reductions and the process that determines how the surplus produced by the agreement
is distributed across members. Our focus is on analyzing a speciﬁc institutional structure 
trade in emission rights  and how a country's key strategic variable  in our model, its initial
permit allocation  shapes the equilibrium surplus division and abatement level. Furthermore,
1Early contributions include Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994). For surveys of this literature
see Barrett (2003), Finus (2003), as well as Missfeldt (1999).
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because we model the choice of emission rights noncooperatively, the gains from permit trade
that we describe are independent of the ability of countries to internalize the pollution externality
caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
Our work also departs from the existing literature in its use of a general equilibrium model to
quantify the strategic aspects of emission trade agreements. A number of studies have established
the importance of general equilibrium responses to global warming abatement policies.2 Reducing
a country's domestic emissions also reduces its demand for fossil fuels. If this decreased fuel
demand is suﬃciently large, it may depress international fuel prices. Emission reductions also
increase the price of energy-intensive goods. These changes in world prices have two eﬀects. First,
they may stimulate increased demand for fossil energy in unregulated countries, increasing their
emission levels. This eﬀect, referred to as carbon leakage (Felder and Rutherford 1993), tends to
reduce a country's incentive to restrict its own emissions because it can expect that its abatement
eﬀort will be partially oﬀset by the increased emission demand elsewhere. Second, they cause
changes in the terms of trade. Countries that are net importers of energy-intensive goods, for
example, are made worse oﬀ because the cost of imports increase while net exporters reap the
beneﬁts of a higher return on their output. Hence, terms of trade eﬀects may either increase
or decrease a country's incentive to reduce emissions depending on that country's orientation in
international markets.
We assume that governments realize their eﬀect on prices in world markets when they set
the size of their initial permit endowments (as in Helm (2003)). Permits are costless for the
government to print so they can, in theory, scale their endowments up or down without bound.
An immediate consequence of this is that countries have leverage in the permit market. Similarly,
if the availability of permits aﬀects the demand or supply for other traded goods, it may give
them leverage in these markets as well. For some countries in our simulations, the ability to aﬀect
terms of trade (rather than concern for the environment) is the primary motive for choosing the
2See Bernstein, Montgomery, Rutherford and Yang (1999) and other papers in the same volume for examples
of studies that calculate the general equilibrium implications of exogenous abatement proposals. There are also
some studies that aim to synthesize strategic and economic aspects of the abatement problem (e.g., Nordhaus
and Yang (1996), Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), Tol (2001)). However, none analyzes emission trading and none
uses a framework that allows for a detailed modeling of general equilibrium eﬀects.
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size of their initial permit allocation.
In contrast we assume that once permit endowments have been established, international
markets for permits and other goods are competitive. An implication of this is that, in our
model, governments are unable to use trade policy to aﬀect the terms of trade in markets for
emission permits or other goods  as if they are bound by the rules of a free-trade agreement
 but are able to use environmental policy toward this end. Similarly, it implies that permit-
holding ﬁrms do not exercise market power and that governments do not intervene after they
have set the total number of permits available to ﬁrms. The latter assumption is not entirely
innocuous as there are several countries where the government still has a strong inﬂuence on the
energy sector. However, we see the assumption that markets are competitive as the natural one
to make in our analysis because the direct manipulation of international markets is increasingly
limited by the rise of free-trade agreements and the broadening coverage of the WTO. We assume
that the rules governing trade in emission permits would be subject to the same trend.3
Our simulations suggest that permit trade agreements can be eﬀective abatement devices
even in a world of non-cooperative countries. We ﬁnd that equilibrium permit-trade agreements
can achieve almost twice the emission reductions implied by the Nash equilibrium with no permit
trade and more than half of the reductions that would be prescribed by following a global ﬁrst-
best emission policy. Furthermore, the mechanisms that explain this result are quite diﬀerent
from those highlighted in the existing literature on IEAs. The most eﬀective agreements are
sub-global and involve countries with high environmental beneﬁts and high abatement costs
buying large volumes of emission permits from their developing-world partners (either China or
members of the former Soviet Union). This is because permit-selling countries are motivated
by their ability to capture surplus from permit sales. In doing so they face a trade-oﬀ since
choosing more permits reduces the equilibrium permit price. Agreements with smaller numbers
of sellers are better able to capture the monopoly markup by restricting the size of their permit
endowment. This causes the agreement as a whole to produce fewer emissions and shifts the
3There is a substantial literature in trade theory that anticipates the use environmental policy as a substitute
for trade policy as free-trade agreements become more commonplace. See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a recent
survey of this literature.
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share of the surplus created by permit trade to developing-world sellers, increasing the likelihood
of their participation.
In much the same way that member states try to manage their eﬀect on the permit market,
they also try to inﬂuence prices and quantities in the markets for energy and energy-intensive
goods. An important determinant of whether equilibria lead to signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁts
is whether the dominant inﬂuence of international trade is via quantities (carbon leakage) or
prices (terms of trade eﬀects). The relative strength of these two eﬀects depends on the degree
to which foreign and domestic varieties of energy-intensive goods are substitutes. The carbon
leakage eﬀect dominates when traded goods from diﬀerent regions are close substitutes. This
tends to increase global emissions. Terms of trade eﬀects dominate when traded goods are
imperfect substitutes. This tends to decrease global emissions.
A ﬁnal point on experimental design is in order before we move on. The research strategy we
have described uses the quantitative content of the general equilibrium model to inform the game-
theoretic analysis. This allows us to examine complex issues such as coalition formation with
heterogenous countries and general equilibrium eﬀects, which are diﬃcult to analyze in a purely
analytical model. However, all studies of global warming policy confront sizeable uncertainties
regarding growth paths, technological change and the regional demand for climate protection.
Thus interpreting our results as precise quantitative estimates would be a mistake. Our goal is to
conduct thought-experiments with representative parameter values and look for general insights
that may help to guide the design of post-Kyoto climate policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, with
a schematic overview of both the economic general equilibrium model and the game-theoretic
framework through which the model determines regional emission levels and permit allocations.
A detailed analysis of the ﬁrst-order conditions illustrates how participation in permit trade
and other world markets inﬂuence a country's decision regarding the size of its initial permit
endowment. Section 3 describes the data used to calibrate model parameters. Results are
presented in Section 4 followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. The appendix contains
sensitivity analysis and describes the methods we use to solve the numerical model. [Note: The
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appendix material (submitted for review in a separate ﬁle) is included for the beneﬁt of reviewers.
This material could be included in the JEEM online archive.]
2 The Model
The model consists of two components  the competitive general equilibrium system which
determines regional abatement costs and international trade ﬂows, and a submodel of strategic
interactions between regional governments that determines the membership and emission levels
of permit-trade agreements. While it is conceptually useful to think about these components
separately, it is important to note that they are part of a jointly determined system in our
analysis.
2.1 Competitive Equilibrium in the World Economy
We model the economic impacts of regional abatement choices with a static Shoven-Whalley
general equilibrium trade model. We consider six regions (USA, Japan, Western Europe, China,
Former Soviet Union, and Rest of World). Within each regional economy, goods are produced
in seven sectors (Coal, Crude Oil, Electricity, Natural Gas, Reﬁned Oil, Energy-Intensive Goods,
and Other Manufactures and Services). All goods can be used to satisfy intermediate or ﬁnal
demands except for crude oil which is only used as an intermediate good. All goods may be
traded internationally. Naturally, the weight of the modeling detail falls on the energy sectors,
as this is where the direct eﬀects of emission policies will be felt.
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic sketch of the model. Final consumption (C) follows from
the budget-constrained utility maximization of a representative agent in each region. The agent
supplies primary factors labor (ωL), capital (ωK), fossil-fuel speciﬁc resources (ωR) and emission
permits (ωE). Emission permits must be used in ﬁxed proportion to fossil fuel consumption based
on the carbon content of the diﬀerent fuels. There is no abatement technology in the model that
allows countries to reduce emissions without reducing the use of fossil fuels. Perfectly competitive
ﬁrms produce goods for export to other regions, for intermediate input to the production of other
goods (I), for ﬁnal consumption and for investment. Factor revenue ﬁnances the purchase of ﬁnal
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consumption goods and capital stock investment.
Figure 1: Regional Flows of Goods and Factors
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Labor, capital and emission permits are intersectorally mobile within regions but cannot
move between regions. The production of crude oil, coal and gas each makes use of its own
resource-speciﬁc factor, resulting in upward sloping supply schedules for fossil fuels. Bilateral
trade in all conventional goods takes the form of Armington demand functions in which goods
are distinguished by region of origin (indicated by r1, r2, and r3 in the ﬁgure), so that a region's
consumers view imports of diﬀerent origins as imperfect substitutes. This substitution pattern
follows a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function which aggregates
all import varieties to an import bundle. The international trade in emission permits takes place
on a single, undiﬀerentiated market between agreement members.
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Regional welfare depends on the current economic utility from consuming the produce of
the traditional (non-environmental) sectors of the economy and on environmental damages of
global carbon emissions. These two components of welfare are assumed to be separable. We also
assume that the marginal utility of reductions in global emissions (νr) is constant. Accordingly,
welfare in region r is deﬁned as:
Wr = Ur(pi, ωr)− νreG, (1)
where pi is the vector of prices for goods and factors, ωr = (ωKr , ω
L
r , ω
R
r , ω
E
r ) is the vector of
region r's primary factor endowments, and eG =
∑
r ω
E
r is the global emission level. Ur(pi, ωr)
is the indirect utility function that is implied by solving the representative agent's constrained
optimization problem over conventional goods.
For purposes of setting out the game-theoretic model in the next sections, we can represent
the general equilibrium model as a system of equations:
F (z;ωE) = 0, (2)
in which z ∈ RN is the vector of equilibrium prices and quantities of other factors, ωE ∈ Rn
is a vector of exogenous factor endowments representing regional emission rights for carbon
dioxide, and F : RN ⇒ RN is the set of equations which deﬁne the economic equilibrium.
N is the dimension of the equilibrium model (roughly 400) and n is the number of regions.
Following Mathiesen (1985), we formulate the general equilibrium model as a system of equations
in which the model variables include good and factor prices (pi) that are associated with market-
clearance conditions, and activity levels (Y ) for producers that are associated with the zero-
proﬁt conditions that typically characterize ﬁrms in perfectly competitive markets. We therefore
partition z into price and quantity variables as z = (pi, Y ).
A detailed description of the model and its empirical implementation is provided in the
appendices, but a few ﬁnal points on its implementation are worth noting here. The simulation
results are based on a calibration point projected forward to the year 2015, but the model is
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essentially static. Thus we have suppressed time subscripts throughout the paper. A discussion
of the calibration procedure is contained in section 3.
We have chosen to work with a static model to highlight the aspects of permit trading
agreements that are the focus of the study. The cost of this approach is that we cannot address the
question of how strategic permit trade interacts with some of the important dynamic aspects of
global warming. For example, we model willingness to pay for instantaneous emission reductions
instead of willingness to pay for actual climate improvements which is known to be a function of
the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Similarly, the full cost of abatement activity
today would be most naturally viewed as the discounted stream of future costs imposed on the
economy, including the eﬀects of discouraged capital formation that it implies. Agents in our
model respond only to current costs. Thus, regional GDP and investment are assumed to grow
exogenously and in ﬁxed proportions. A comprehensive forecast of the welfare eﬀects of global
warming policy would need to take these considerations into account, but we view them as
separable from the insights on the role of permit trade in global warming policy that we develop
here.
2.2 Strategic Interaction
We now turn to the game-theoretic model. We assume that regions are confronted with a proposal
specifying the potential members of a trading coalition. We do not model how this proposal arises
but simply take it as a given outcome of the international negotiation process. In particular,
let R be the set of regions. In stage 0, nature proposes a coalition C ⊆ R : |C| ≥ 2 of permit
trading regions. The strategic interaction is modeled as an extensive-form game involving the
successive play of two simultaneous move games.
In stage 1 of the game, regions r ∈ C decide about their membership in the proposed permit
trading regime. In a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, no region wants to change its participation
or non-participation decision, given the decisions of the other regions. Regions r /∈ C reach no
decision node at stage 1.
In stage 2, all regions choose emission rights as individual best replies to the choices of the
9
other regions. In doing so, they anticipate the interregional trading of emission rights  which
is restricted to coalition members  and of the other (non-strategic) goods in our economy.
In the numerical simulations, we solve the above game for all possible coalition proposals C.
Thereby, we identify all permit trading coalitions that can be established as a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
The above game diﬀers in two fundamental respects from nearly all of the literature that
uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze self-enforcing environmental agreements (see Finus
(2003) for a survey). First, the standard assumption in this literature is that coalition members
cooperatively choose their emissions at a level that is eﬃcient from the coalitional perspective.4
Consequently, trade in emission rights has no eﬀect on the overall emission level. In our model,
coalition members non-cooperatively choose their endowment of tradable permits. Consequently,
trading is crucial  without it the outcome would collapse to the standard non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium in emissions. As the later simulations show, this leads to substantially diﬀerent levels
of welfare and emissions.
The second diﬀerence concerns the equilibrium concept. It is common to use the stability
criteria of (i) internal stability (no coalition member wants to leave a coalition), and (ii) external
stability (no region wants to join a coalition) (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994)).
This is closely related to the Nash equilibrium of our membership game in stage 1, where no
regions wants to change its participation or non-participation decision, given the decisions of the
other countries.
However, by assuming that coalition proposals arise as an outcome of international negoti-
ations, we introduce a mechanism by which coalition members can block the access of others
into the trading regime. Such a mechanism is common in many international treaties such as
WTO, EU and NATO. It also seems realistic in our case that existing members want to regulate
entry to prevent those regions from joining which would choose a very high number of permits
and, thereby, lead to the breakdown of the coalition. This contrasts with the `standard' model,
where joining regions choose their emissions cooperatively so that the external stability criterion
4Exceptions are Murdoch, Sandler and Vijverberg (2003) as well as Finus (2004).
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constitutes less of an obstacle for cooperation.
For example, in the following numerical simulations the usa-chn coalition does not satisfy
external stability because fsu would want to join (see Table 2, p. 21). However, given the permit
choices of fsu the extended coalition is unattractive for usa, which would then decide not to
participate. By contrast, if international negotiations result in the coalition proposal usa-chn,
then the two can form a stable trading coalition because the Nash equilibrium of the membership
game in stage 1 considers only the participation decisions of usa and chn.5
However, in section 4.1 we also consider an equilibrium reﬁnement of the SPNE that requires
that for any SPNE coalition there exists no larger SPNE coalition which is a proper superset and
in which all members are better oﬀ. Consequently, regions are admitted to join a coalition, but
only if this is individually beneﬁcial to both current and joining members. We call this condition
weak external stability to make clear that it resembles the standard external stability criterion
but is less strict.
The Rest of World (row) region is not modeled as a (strategic) player of the game. row is
composed of a large number of heterogeneous nations. Modeling them as a unitary actor would
misrepresent their individual strategic inﬂuence. Furthermore, row includes many developing
countries which are unlikely to pursue strategic climate change policies. For parsimony, we
assume that emissions in this region simply reﬂect regional demand for fossil fuels at the prevailing
market prices.6
2.2.1 Regional Choice of Emission Rights
The game is solved by backwards induction and we ﬁrst determine regional choices of emission
rights. From the perspective of consumers and ﬁrms in the regional economy, emission rights
endowments are like any other exogenous factor endowment, just as the notation in (2) suggests.
5Nevertheless, the best coalition in our later numerical simulations also satisﬁes the traditional internal and
external stability criterion. Accordingly, it would constitute a SPNE if there were no proposal of coalition members
by nature, but in stage 1 regions would simply decide whether they want to be a member of a permit trading
regime or not.
6The Former Soviet Union (fsu) is also a region composed of more than one autonomous state but we assume
that it acts as a single strategic entity. This reﬂects that Russia is the dominant player in this region  both
in terms of emissions and in terms of the political inﬂuence that it wields in the fsu region. Furthermore, our
dataset does not allow us to separate Russia from the other countries contained in fsu.
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Unlike other endowments, however, governments choose the regional level of emission rights
strategically to maximize regional welfare. For non-members of the permit trading agreement
this welfare is given by (1). For members it also includes their net income from transactions on
the permit market,
(
ωEr − er
)
piE , where er is aggregate demand for emissions in region r and
piE is the equilibrium permit price.
In the following, we ﬁrst abstract from the latter, i.e. we discuss the strategic behavior of
non-members. Later on, we analyze the additional eﬀects that arise for participants of the inter-
national permit market. Accordingly, a strategic region r that is a coalition outsider maximizes
(1) and chooses its level of emission rights by equating the marginal economic cost of abatement
with the marginal environmental beneﬁt, hence:
dWr
dωEr
=
dUr
dωEr
− νr de
G
dωEr
= 0 (3)
When economic preferences are homothetic, as we assume in our model, economic welfare
(Ur) can be expressed in terms of the ratio of regional income to the unit expenditure function
(the price index) for a unit of consumption.7 For the purpose of decomposing the marginal
economic cost of abatement ( dUr
dωEr
from (3)) by sector, it is useful to write regional income in
terms of the value of net output.8 Thus, Ur becomes:
Ur =
∑
i (Yirpiir −
∑
s Iisrpiis)
pcr(pi)
(4)
where i indexes the joint set of factors and goods, and r and s index the set of regions. Yir is
the aggregate supply of good (or factor) i in region r, piir is the price of commoditity i produced
by region r, and Iisr is aggregate intermediate demand for i imported from s to r. pcr(pi) is the
representative agent's unit expenditure function. In the numerical model, this is derived from
the solution to the maximization of a nested CES utility function subject to the limitations of
region r's factor endowment income.
7We use a linearly-homogeneous cardinalization of economic preferences so that marginal changes in Ur can
be interpreted as equivalent variations in income at benchmark prices.
8The identity between regional factor income and the value of net output that we use to obtain (4) requires
an economy with no taxes and balanced trade.
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Diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to region r's endowment of emission rights, ωEr , gives us:
dUr
dωEr
=
1
pcr
∑
i
[
Yir
dpiir
dωEr
+
dYir
dωEr
piir −
∑
s
(
Iisr
dpiis
dωEr
+
dIisr
dωEr
piis + Ur
∂pcr
∂piis
dpiis
dωEr
)]
(5)
Shepard's lemma and homotheticity of the preference function together imply that the ﬁnal term
on the right-hand side of (5) can be written in terms of ﬁnal consumption demands (Cisr):
dUr
dωEr
=
1
pcr
∑
i
[
Yir
dpiir
dωEr
+
dYir
dωEr
piir −
∑
s
(
Iisr
dpiis
dωEr
+
dIisr
dωEr
piis + Cisr
dpiis
dωEr
)]
(6)
In the absence of taxes, the regional value of net output must equal the regional value of factor
endowments. ∑
i
(
Yirpiir −
∑
s
Iisrpiis
)
=
∑
k
ωkrpikr (7)
where k indexes the set of primary factors (K,L,R,E). Hence:
∑
i
(
dYir
dωEr
piir −
∑
s
dIisr
dωEr
piis
)
=
∑
k
dωkr
dωEr
pikr = piEr (8)
where piEr is the price of emission rights in region r. Using (8) and rearranging terms we can
re-write the full optimality condition from (3) as:
1
pcr
piEr +
∑
i
(Yir − Cirr − Iirr) dpiir
dωEr
−
∑
s 6=r
(Cisr + Iisr)
dpiis
dωEr

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToT Effects
 = νr
1 +derowdωEr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Carbon Leakage

(9)
The left-hand side of (9) describes the marginal economic costs of abatement and the right-
hand side describes the marginal environmental beneﬁts. piEr represents the direct cost of a
marginal reduction in the size of region r's emission rights, and in a partial equilibrium model
with no international permit trade, equilibrium would be given by:
1
pcr
piEr = νr (10)
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The terms labeled ToT Eﬀects in (9) capture the eﬀects of emission rights choices on regional
income through changes in the terms of trade that region r faces, where the ﬁrst term in the large
rounded brackets describes the eﬀects of changes in the prices of goods produced in region r and
the second term describes the eﬀects of changes in the prices of foreign goods. The right-hand
side of (9) describes the marginal environmental beneﬁts of a marginal change in emissions. This
includes a direct eﬀect due to the change in emissions from region r and an indirect, carbon
leakage eﬀect.
Domestic abatement implies reduced energy demand for region r. This causes energy prices
to fall and the prices of energy-intensive goods to rise, inducing increased demand for fuel and
emissions abroad. This is the source of the carbon leakage eﬀect. Because the contribution of
strategic regions to world emissions are capped by the availability of emission rights, the only
source of leakage in the model comes from the response of the non-strategic row countries, hence
deG
dωEr
from (3) becomes
(
1 + derow
dωEr
)
. The carbon leakage eﬀect will tend to diminish the incentive
for domestic abatement by region r because derow
dωEr
< 0.
Now consider the terms of trade eﬀect terms on the left-hand side of (9). The individual terms
in the sum over i may take on either a positive or negative sign depending on the whether region
r is a net exporter or importer of good i and whether an incremental change in the endowment
with emission rights causes the price of good i to rise or fall. For example, an increased supply
of emission rights will tend to lower the price of energy-intensive goods
(
dpiir
dωEr
, dpiis
dωEr
< 0
)
because
emission rights are an input to the production processes of these goods. If region r is a net
exporter of these goods (Yir −
∑
s(Cisr + Iisr) > 0), then higher emission rights levels will tend
to make region r worse oﬀ through the terms of trade eﬀect. This is because lowering the price
reduces the revenue the region collects on their exports of energy-intensive goods and, therefore,
lowers region r income. In contrast, price reductions on goods for which the region is a net
importer are beneﬁcial because they lower the regional cost of living.
In principle, there will be a terms of trade eﬀect (within the i-sum in (9)) for each commodity
that region r trades internationally. Because of their relationship to the level of region r's permit
endowment, however, we would expect the largest eﬀects experienced by a region that is a
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coalition outsider to occur in the markets for energy-intensive goods and fossil fuels.
When r is a coalition member, they will also account for the impact of their emission
rights choices on terms of trade in the international permit market itself. These are given by(
ωEr − er
)
dpiE
dωEr
, where dpiE
dωEr
< 0 because a larger supply of permits reduces their equilibrium price.
This gives permit exporters an incentive to increase their scarcity and importers an incentive to
increase their abundance.
To sum up, terms of trade eﬀects in markets for conventional goods that are tied to the
production of emissions and in markets for internationally tradable emission permits are impor-
tant for countries' choices of emission rights. They give net exporters (importers) of permits or
energy-intensive goods the incentive to lower (raise) the level of their emission cap. They give
net exporters (importers) of fossil fuels the incentive to lower (raise) the level of their emission
cap.
For a given coalition membership, whether or not the coalition achieves emission reductions
will depend on how elastic the responses of net importers and exporters are. The eﬀect of adding
new members to a permit trade agreement will depend on whether the role they will play in
the agreement will be as a net importer or exporter of permits. Adding permit exporters will
tend to raise the aggregate supply of permits as suppliers compete for surplus, analogous to
the quantity competition that takes place in the Cournot model. Similarly, adding potential
permit buyers will tend to decrease aggregate supply. We use the numerical model to determine
what magnitude of emission reduction results from each coalition and which coalitions represent
equilibria.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Outcomes
In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, no potential coalition member wants to change its deci-
sion whether to participate in the proposed permit trading regime, and the Nash equilibrium of
the stage 2 game is deﬁned as:
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1
pcr
[
piE +
(
ωEr − er
) dpiE
dωEr
+ ∆r
]
− νr
(
1 +
derow
dωEr
)
= 0 , ∀r ∈ C (11)
1
pcr
[piEr + ∆r]− νr
(
1 +
derow
dωEr
)
= 0 , ∀r /∈ {C, row}
F (z;ωE) = 0
where ∆r describes the terms of trade eﬀects associated with trade in all conventional goods:
∆r =
∑
i 6=E
(Yir − Cirr − Iirr) dpiir
dωEr
−
∑
s 6=r
(Cisr + Iisr)
dpiis
dωEr
 (12)
The ﬁrst two lines of (11) describe the emission rights problems faced by coalition members
and non-members, respectively, based on the generic expression in (9). Because permits are
bought and sold across member countries, their price (piE) captures the joint abatement possi-
bilities of these countries, whereas the permit price in nonmember countries (piEr) captures only
domestic abatement possibilities. Member countries also anticipate how their choice of emission
rights aﬀects the price piE at which they buy or sell permits. 9
The ﬁnal line of (11) indicates that the prices and activity levels that enter the emission
optimality conditions are determined by the general equilibrium module. This is the sense in
which the strategic emission behavior and the general equilibrium module are components of a
simultaneous system.
We judge the achievements of the SPNE emission trade agreements against two benchmarks.
The ﬁrst benchmark, the No-Trade Nash equilibrium, is simply the instance of (11) in which
C is the empty set. The second benchmark is the First-Best allocation of emission rights,
which is deﬁned as the solution in which each country sets emission rights to equate its marginal
9In the discussion of our simulation results (Section 4), we analyze the numerical counterparts to the diﬀerent
marginal eﬀects discussed here: direct costs and beneﬁts (piE and νr), terms of trade eﬀects in the permit market
(
`
ωEr − er
´
dpiE
dωEr
) and in conventional markets (∆r), and carbon leakage (νr
derow
dωEr
).
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abatement costs with the sum of marginal beneﬁts over all model regions:
1
pcr
[piEr + ∆r]−
∑
s
νs
(
1 +
derow
dωEr
)
= 0 , ∀r /∈ {row} (13)
F (z;ωE) = 0
We should note that equation (13) is a ﬁrst best calculation in very speciﬁc sense. It is the
program in which all strategic regions in the model fully internalize the environmental impacts
of their emissions. This deﬁnition excludes two elements that will also impact global economic
eﬃciency. First, it does not allow for the direct regulation of row emissions. Second, it does
not prohibit strategic regions from taking terms of trade into account in choosing their initial
permit levels.
3 Data
The GTAP5 trade and production database (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) provides the base
year data with which we calibrate the production and utility functions that describe the general
equilibrium model. These data provide a consistent representation of energy markets in physical
units together with economic accounts of regional production, consumption, and bilateral trade
ﬂows for 1998. We also employ growth projections in order to project the economy forward
to 2015, the year in which all of our policy experiments take place. The growth projections
are based on the International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2002 dataset (US 2002) which provides
baseline estimates of regional GDP, population and carbon dioxide emission levels. We express
our model results as deviations from the Business as Usual (BaU) predictions produced by this
dataset. The assumption in the BaU simulations is that countries do not implement any climate
policies, so that ﬁrms use fossil fuels and produce carbon emissions at levels that are consistent
with price-taking, proﬁt-maximizing behavior.
Table 1 reports baseline growth trajectories for GDP and carbon emissions. There is signiﬁ-
cant GDP growth in all model regions over the twenty year horizon, but the fastest growth occurs
in the developing world. Regional diﬀerences in per capita GDP growth are less pronounced but
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roughly mirror the changes in total output. Growth in total carbon emissions generally reﬂects
the economic growth patterns, and the developing world is the most important source of new
emissions. It also achieves the largest improvements in the carbon intensity of output because
of the more rapid retirement of old, ineﬃcient capital for newer technologies.
Table 1: GDP and Carbon Statistics
GDP GDP per capita Carbon per capita Carbon per GDP
1998 2015 %∆ 1998 2015 %∆ 1998 2015 %∆ 1998 2015 %∆
usa 8,719 14,696 4.0 32,197 46,967 2.7 5.5 6.3 0.8 171 134 -1.4
jpn 4,294 5,828 2.4 33,847 45,557 2.4 2.4 2.8 1.0 70 61 -1.1
eur 8,729 13,180 2.9 22,470 33,816 2.9 2.4 2.8 0.9 108 82 -1.4
chn 974 3,148 12.5 776 2,233 10.7 0.6 1.0 5.5 763 439 -2.0
fsu 539 1,233 6.8 1,834 4,405 7.3 2.0 3.0 2.4 1107 666 -2.3
row 6,493 12,857 5.9 1,823 2,748 3.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 313 252 -1.2
GDP in billions $1998
GDP per capita in $1998 per person)
Carbon per capita in tons per person
Carbon per GDP in grams per $1998
%∆  Equivalent constant annual growth rate
A few of the assumptions required to match the GTAP database to our application are worth
noting. Our model is static, so we do not describe the capital dynamics associated with diﬀerent
abatement policies. We assume that investment is ﬁxed in proportion to regional GDP, and GDP
is based on the growth projections from the IEO. For simplicity we abstract from issues related
to tax revenues and current account imbalances which could be aﬀected by abatement policy.10
Modeling the demand for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions also requires an assumption
about the value that regions place on emission reductions. Our calibration is based on the
idea that countries reveal their willingness to pay for environmental improvements through their
position in global warming negotiations (Mäler 1989). The marginal willingness to pay values
are calibrated with the aim to reﬂect the regions' positions in international climate negotiations.
Of the three OECD regions in our sample, Europe has shown a considerably higher willingness
to reduce its emissions than the United States and Japan. Based on this we assume a marginal
10We ignore tax interaction eﬀects in the present analysis since such an extension would require a substantial
overhaul of the underlying GTAP social accounting data (see Gurgel, Metcalf, Osouf and Reilly (2007)). Sensitivity
analysis with respect to pre-existing energy taxes, which are part of the GTAP database, indicates that including
these taxes has only limited impact on the model results (see Appendix A).
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value of abatement (1998, US-$ per ton of carbon) of 300 for Western Europe (eur), and of 150
for Japan (jpn) and the United States (usa). The remaining model regions have shown a much
lower willingness to pay for carbon abatement. Accordingly, we calibrate the countries that make
up the Former Soviet Union (fsu) at 50 and China (chn) as well as the Rest of World region
(row) at 0. Overall, these assumptions lead to global emission reductions in the no-trade Nash
equilibrium of 7.8% as compared to the business as usual scenario. This ﬁgure seems to conform
with the assessments of climate policy experts (Böhringer and Löschel 2005), as well as with the
results of integrated-assessment studies such as RICE (Nordhaus and Yang 1996).
There are no widely accepted estimates of regional willingness to pay for climate improve-
ments, so we have undertaken several model runs with alternative values.11 The qualitative
insights that are discussed in the following appear to be very stable, as long as diﬀerences in
the willingness to pay across regions are suﬃciently large. To illustrate this, in section 4.3 we
present one scenario where we raise the marginal value of abatement for fsu to 100 and for chn
to 50.
4 Results
This section discusses the results of several illustrative numerical simulations. Section 4.1 de-
scribes the equilibrium emission trade agreements and the incentive structures that typify the
more successful agreements under baseline calibration of the model. Section 4.2 explores the
eﬀects of international trade  via terms of trade eﬀects and carbon leakage  in more de-
tail. Section 4.3 considers how changes in the distribution of marginal willingness to pay for
environmental improvements aﬀects the prospects for eﬀective emission trade agreements.
11Other studies have adopted an alternative approach, using estimates of economic costs of predicted physical
impacts of global warming (Nordhaus 1991, Nordhaus and Yang 1996, Botteon and Carraro 1997). We believe
that these attempts are no less conjectural given the current state of climate science (Tol 2002). Nevertheless, it
is interesting to note an important diﬀerence. In Nordhaus and Yang (1996), for example, developing countries
like China have the highest values for climate protections because their economies are disproportionately tied
to agriculture and their populations disproportionately exposed to the elements (such as ﬂoods, droughts, and
vector-born diseases). As these countries also have the lowest abatement costs, little permit trade would take
place in our model. China would simply undertake all of the abatement it demands at home as this is the least
costly method (see section 4).
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4.1 Analysis of Emission Trading Coalitions
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 lists all coalitions that can be formed. For each of them we solved
equation system (11) for model year 2015. The results are summarized in the following columns,
which display welfare diﬀerences from the no-trade Nash equilibrium as well as the global emission
reductions from BaU. Coalitions that are SPNEs are indicated with a *. Coalitions that also
satisfy the weak external stability condition that there exists no larger SPNE coalition which
improves the welfare of all its members are indicated with a **.12
The rows of the table are sorted by the level of the global emission reduction that each
coalition produces. The simulations were performed under the assumption that varieties of the
same good produced by diﬀerent countries are relatively close substitutes (i.e. homogenous
trade). We discuss the signiﬁcance of this assumption in Section 4.2.
The abatement achievements of the diﬀerent coalitions run the gamut from coalitions that
actually lead to higher emission levels than the no-trade Nash equilibrium to reductions of nearly
twice that level. The more successful outcomes (both in welfare and abatement terms) involve
chn  a developing country with low abatement cost  paired with eur  a region with high
abatement cost and the highest valuation for abatement. This shows that a coalition of permit
traders is most successful when it can exploit such asymmetries across its members.
Given that permit endowments are chosen noncooperatively by self-interested countries, these
asymmetries lead to substantial diﬀerences in endowment choices. This can be seen from Table
3, which compares regional permit and emission choices for the eur-chn-fsu coalition (the
best SPNE outcome from Table 2) to the no-trade Nash outcome. eur, the coalition member
with the highest valuation for abatement, chooses a permit endowment of only 28% of its BaU
emissions. In contrast, chn and fsu have much lower valuations for abatement and, therefore,
choose substantially larger permit endowments. In the case of fsu, these even exceed its BaU-
emissions; a result which mirrors the phenomenon of `hot air' in the Kyoto Protocol (Böhringer
and Löschel 2003).
12For example, jpn-eur-chn-fsu is not a SPNE because jpn can improve its welfare by leaving the coalition.
Similarly, chn-fsu does not satisfy weak external stability since eur-chn-fsu is a SPNE in which the welfare of
all members is higher.
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Table 2: Coalitions by Emission Reduction and Welfare Change, 2015
Homogenous Trade (σDM , σMM ) = (8, 16)
% Equivalent Variation Global Emission
usa jpn eur chn fsu row %EV Reduction
First-Best 1.2 6.2 4.7 -3.0 0.1 -0.1 1.7 21.4
Shapley (eur,chn) 1.0 3.6 0.5 0.5 5.6 0 1.2 15.4
jpn,eur,chn,fsu 0.9 2.7 1.6 0.7 9.0 0 1.0 14.1
eur,chn,fsu** 0.8 2.9 1.5 0.6 8.2 0 1.0 14.0
eur,chn** 0.8 2.9 1.8 0.4 4.5 0 1.0 13.9
jpn,eur,chn 0.8 2.9 1.7 0.6 4.5 0 1.0 13.8
usa,eur,chn 0.8 2.7 1.2 1.7 4.3 0 1.0 13.6
usa,jpn,eur,chn,fsu 0.7 2.3 0.9 1.8 12.2 0 1.0 13.6
usa,jpn,eur,chn 0.8 2.7 1.2 1.8 4.2 0 1.0 13.5
usa,eur,chn,fsu 0.7 2.7 0.9 1.6 11.4 0 1.0 13.4
jpn,chn** 0.7 1.8 1.7 0.2 3.6 0 0.8 12.7
usa,jpn,chn 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.0 3.1 0 0.8 12.2
jpn,chn,fsu 0.5 1.4 1.3 0.2 2.8 0 0.6 11.6
usa,jpn,chn,fsu 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.9 5.5 0 0.7 11.5
usa,chn** 0.3 1.6 1.2 0.7 2.3 0 0.6 11.2
usa,chn,fsu 0.2 1.4 1.0 0.7 3.7 0 0.5 10.7
chn,fsu* 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 0 0.4 10.2
eur,fsu* 0.1 0.4 0.1 0 3.1 0 0.1 8.5
usa,eur,fsu 0.1 0.3 -0.4 0 8.9 0 0.1 8.5
jpn,eur,fsu 0.1 0.4 0 0 3.5 0 0.1 8.5
usa,jpn,eur,fsu 0.1 0.4 -0.5 0 9.0 0 0.1 8.4
usa,eur 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0 0.4 0 0.1 8.3
jpn,fsu** 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0.7 0 0.1 8.3
usa,jpn,eur 0.1 0.8 -0.3 0 0.2 0 0 8.1
No-Trade Nash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.8
jpn,eur 0 0.2 -0.1 0 0 0 0 7.8
usa,jpn,fsu -0.1 -0.4 0 0 3.7 0 0 7.7
usa,jpn 0 0 -0.1 0 -0.1 0 0 7.7
usa,fsu -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0 2.2 0 -0.1 7.4
* indicates that a coalition is a SPNE.
** indicates a SPNE coalition which satisﬁes the weak external stability condition.
% Equivalent Variation: % change in money-metric utility from Nash without trading.
Emission Reduction: % reduction in global emissions from BaU.
Global %EV: global equivalent variation as % change from no-trade Nash
Our simulations suggest that hot air is less of a problem with respect to chn's participation
in a climate treaty. It is interesting to explore this diﬀerence in more depth. After all, permits
are precious, as indicated by the permit price in Table 3, and coalition members are free to choose
their initial permit allocation in our noncooperative framework. Furthermore, chn's valuation
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Table 3: eur-chn-fsu Coalition Proﬁle, 2015
Homogenous Trade (σDM , σMM ) = (8, 16)
No-Trade Nash Coalition Coalition Permit Equivalent
Emissions Emissions Endowments Prices Variation
Coalition Members
eur 80.6 91.5 27.8 79.7 1.5
chn 95.6 48.6 77.3 79.7 0.6
fsu 95.1 84.5 120.8 79.7 8.2
Outsiders
usa 72.6 73.1 - 126.9 0.8
jpn 84.4 84.6 - 131.6 2.9
Non-strategic
row 106.7 108.7 - 0 0
No-Trade Nash Emissions: no-trade Nash emissions as % of BaU
Coalition Emissions: equilibrium emissions with coalition as % of BaU
Coalition Endowments: permit endowment as % of BaU emissions
Coalition Permit Prices: real permit price ($/Tons)
Equivalent Variation: EV as % change from no-trade Nash equilibrium
for climate protection is lower than that of fsu which, by itself, should lead to higher permit
endowments (see the ﬁnal term from the ﬁrst-order conditions in (11)). Strategic considerations
in the permit market provide the answer to this puzzle. To understand this point, consider the
hypothetical situation where chn and fsu both have permit endowments equal in size to their
BaU emission levels. If chn has lower abatement costs than fsu (as it does in the model), it
would sell more permits. Therefore, chn has a strong interest in maintaining a high permit
price. It achieves this by reducing the size of its permit endowment. fsu sells comparatively few
permits in this experiment. Therefore, its losses due to a lower permit price are relatively low,
and the incentive to sell more permits by increasing the permit endowment dominates.13
General equilibrium eﬀects provide a further explanation for the diﬀerent endowment choices
of chn and fsu. Less emissions and energy use lead to lower energy prices and higher prices
for energy-intensive goods (both contributions to a negative ∆r term from (11)). chn is a net
importer of fossil fuels and a net exporter of energy-intensive goods. They ﬁnd it in their interest
13In the ﬁrst-order conditions, the eﬀect that more permits increase supply, thereby generally reducing the
equilibrium permit price and lowering revenues from permit sales, is represented by a negative second term in
square brackets in the ﬁrst line of (11)
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to exploit both of these terms of trade eﬀects by restricting their permit levels. By contrast, fsu
is a net exporter of fossil fuels and net importer of energy-intensive goods so that it faces the
opposite incentives.
Despite the diversity among the coalition members, all regions beneﬁt from agreement on
trading (see column equivalent variation), though for diﬀerent reasons. For eur it becomes
much cheaper to foster its environmental goals  by choosing a low permit endowment 
because that part of abatement which would be most costly is shifted through the permit market
to the other regions. Indeed, after-trade emissions of eur greatly exceed its permit allocation
and are even higher than its emissions in the no-trade Nash equilibrium. By contrast, the low
valuation regions chn and fsu beneﬁt primarily from selling permits. After trading, they both
emit less than in the no-trade Nash equilibrium. These gains are considerably larger for fsu
because most of its permit sales result from `hot air', while chn's permit sales are associated
with actual reductions in emissions. Finally, the coalition outsiders usa and jpn beneﬁt from
the favorable terms of trade eﬀects and the reduced emissions generated by the coalition.
We have demonstrated that the best trading coalition, eur-chn-fsu, leads to substantial
emission reductions, but it is important to note that it still falls short of the optimal level of
reductions. Taking the no-trade Nash equilibrium as the reference point, it achieves only half
of the emission reductions that would arise in the ﬁrst-best solution (see Table 2). A natural
question is to ask how much of this shortfall is due to our assumption that coalition members
choose their permit endowments noncooperatively, and how much of it is due to noncooperative
decisions to participate in the agreement. In order to address this question, we consider one
solution where coalition members choose emissions to maximize group surplus and agree on
the Shapley value as the surplus-distribution scheme. Accordingly, only the decision to join an
agreement is made noncooperatively.14
The highest reductions are achieved by the coalition eur-chn (listed as eur-chn (Shapley)
in Table 2). Interestingly, the diﬀerence between this solution and the outcome for the agreement
with the same membership but using the noncooperative permit-choice assumption (eur-chn
14This distribution scheme has been applied, e.g., by Barrett (1997) and Botteon and Carraro (1997).
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from Table 2) is small relative to the diﬀerence from the no-trade Nash equilibrium. This indicates
that noncooperative participation decisions are responsible for most of the diﬀerence between
equilibrium and ﬁrst-best outcomes.
4.2 The Structure of International Trade
This section looks more closely at the strategic inﬂuences of international trade on equilibrium
outcomes through carbon leakage and terms of trade eﬀects. Figure 2 reports on the realization
of the individual marginal eﬀects that enter countries' ﬁrst-order conditions in the best coalition
equilibrium, the eur-chn-fsu coalition. The ﬁgure quantiﬁes the individual elements that govern
the size of their chosen permit endowment as described in equation (11), allowing us to determine
the relative importance of the diﬀerent channels of inﬂuence. For each region, the ﬁgure shows
the money-metric value of the direct marginal abatement cost (piEr), the marginal damages from
carbon emissions (νrpcr), the marginal value of carbon leakage (νr
derow
dωEr
pcr), the value of terms-of-
trade eﬀects in the permit market ((ωEr −er) dpiEdωEr ) and the value of the net terms-of-trade eﬀect in
other markets (∆r), where the mappings to the elements in (11) are given in the parentheses.15
The elasticities that govern the structure of international trade, Armington elasticities, are
key parameters for determining the value of carbon leakage and terms of trade eﬀects so Figure
2 describes simulations under two diﬀerent calibrations of the Armington elasticities. Armington
elasticities determine the responsiveness of bilateral trade ﬂows to changes in relative prices.
When these are high, foreign and domestic varieties of trade goods are close substitutes, so
import demand is sensitive to changes in relative prices. In contrast, when imports are less
perfect substitutes, trade patterns are more rigid and economic shocks tend to be transmitted
in prices rather than in quantities. The left side of Figure 2 displays results for the benchmark
15N.B.  We measure the marginal value of the diﬀerent eﬀects driving permit endowment choice at the point
of equilibrium in the eur-chn-fsu coalition. Figure 2, therefore, tells us what forces are important in governing
each country's endowment choice at that point. An alternative would have been to perform a decomposition
on the non-marginal policy response moving from, for example, the no-trade Nash equilibrium to the coalition
equilibrium. A diﬃculty with this type of experiment is that the relative importance of the diﬀerent eﬀects is path
dependent. The magnitude of the diﬀerent marginal eﬀects that enter a country's ﬁrst-order conditions depend
on the order in which we evaluate the adjustments in diﬀerent countries permit endowments. Theory provides
no guidance on the path of adjustment, so one is the position choosing one path arbitrarily or summarizing the
results from repeated decompositions based on diﬀerent paths.
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version of the model, in which foreign and domestic varieties are assumed to be close substitutes
(Homogenous Trade). The right side of the ﬁgure presented the results of the alternative version
of the model in which they are imperfect substitutes (Diﬀerentiated Trade).
Figure 2: Decomposition of First-Order Conditions: EUR-CHN-FSU Coalition, 2015
In a partial equilibrium model, countries would equate direct marginal abatement cost (Marginal
Abatement Cost in the ﬁgure) with the marginal willingness to pay for abatement (Marginal
Damages), as in equation (10). In our model, the diﬀerence between the marginal abatement
cost and the marginal damages reﬂects the degree to which a country's permit choice is modiﬁed
by terms of trade eﬀects in the permit market (ToT - Permits), in other markets (ToT - Other
Goods) and Carbon Leakage. In the ﬁgure, the numerical values of these elements are stacked
vertically with the columns corresponding to each of the strategic regions in the model. Positive
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elements, those incentives that tend to drive increases in the size of a region's permit endowment,
appear above the x-axis and negative elements, those which give regions the incentive to decrease
the size of their endowment, appear below. In equilibrium, where we measure the value of these
derivatives, the negative and positive elements must balance for a region to satisfy its ﬁrst-order
conditions.
The results of the Homegenous Trade model show that the partial equilibrium eﬀects, marginal
abatement cost and marginal damages, are inﬂuential in deciding the level of permit endowment
that a region chooses, as we would expect. What is striking, however, is that carbon leakage and
terms of trade eﬀects also make sizable contributions. Carbon leakage exerts a strong upward
pressure on the endowment choices of usa, jpn and eur. Terms of trade eﬀects in the permit
market are an important determinant of endowment levels for the permit-trading regions, eur,
chn and fsu. Depending on the region, either carbon leakage or ToT eﬀects in the permit
market (or both) are more important than a region's marginal damages or marginal abatement
cost in shaping the equilibrium.
The marginal eﬀect of terms of trade eﬀects in other goods markets plays a relatively minor
role in the benchmark model, but these terms grow in magnitude when we assume that traded
goods are less perfect substitutes (the right side of Figure 2). Terms of trade eﬀects have a
more important inﬂuence on a country's emission decision in a model with highly diﬀerentiated
goods because domestic production cannot be replaced by close substitutes from other countries
when energy prices rise. Hence, countries are more eﬀective at extracting rents from their trade
partners in the course of implementing their abatement policies. In particular, coalition outsiders
usa and jpn experience strong incentives to curb their emissions in order to exploit terms of
trade in the export of energy-intensive goods to coalition member states. Terms of trade eﬀects
in other markets also play a larger role in shaping the allocation decisions of coalition members.
eur has an incentive to increase its permit endowment to increase the value of its non-energy-
intensive exports. chn gets a gain in energy-intensive markets from restricting the size of its
endowment in a fashion similar to the coalition outsiders, and fsu has an incentive to increase
its level of permits to stimulate demand for its fossil fuel exports. At the same time, carbon
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leakage becomes less of a factor because energy-intensive industries are less able to relocate to
countries without emission restrictions under the alternative Armington assumption.
Table 4 demonstrates the eﬀect of bilateral goods trade on the formation of emission trade
coalitions. It lists the achievements of the diﬀerent coalitions in the same format as Table 2 but
assuming that goods are less perfect substitutes. Equilibrium abatement levels are uniformly
higher in these scenarios. Abatement improves from 14% (see Table 2) to 17.3% for the eur-
chn-fsu coalition, and from 7.8% to 11% for the no-trade Nash equilibrium. This is a direct
result of the stronger emission-reducing terms of trade eﬀects and weakened carbon leakage
eﬀects.
It is also interesting to note that the achievements of the best permit trade coalitions change
very little when measured relative to the emission reductions of the no-trade Nash and ﬁrst-best
outcomes. The absolute reduction in emission achieved by the best coalition goes up in the
simulations with the low trade elasticities but so do the emission reductions in the benchmarks
against which we measure the achievements of the coalition. This suggests that terms of trade
eﬀects in markets for conventional goods impart no particular advantage or disadvantage to
the formation of eﬀective permit trade coalitions in our model. These eﬀects are important in
determining the absolute level of emission reductions, however.
These results stand in contrast to Copeland and Taylor (1995) in which strategic manipulation
of terms of trade eﬀects has no eﬀect on the equilibrium global emission level in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In our Armington model, terms of trade eﬀects have an important inﬂuence on
emissions reductions when goods produced at home and abroad are imperfect substitutes.
Observed patterns of bilateral trade with cross-hauling cannot be explained in competitive
equilibrium models where traded goods are perfectly homogenous. It remains an open research
question as to what set of Armington elasticities best characterizes world trade ﬂows. Time-
series estimates of these elasticities can be as low as unity, yet evidence from the evaluation of
free trade agreements (Kehoe 2005) suggests that these values fail to predict large swings in
the composition of trade when barriers to trade are lowered. Cross-section estimates (Hummels
(2001) and Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic and Keeney (2003)) lend support to higher values. Recent
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Table 4: Coalitions by Emission Reduction and Welfare Change, 2015
Diﬀerentiated Trade (σDM , σMM ) = (1, 2)
% Equivalent Variation Global Emission
usa jpn eur chn fsu row %EV Reduction
First-Best 1.3 7.6 5.3 -4.2 0.8 -0.6 1.9 28.7
Shapley (eur,chn) 1.2 3.9 0.5 0.5 6.6 -0.1 1.3 19.8
eur,chn* 0.9 3.0 1.9 1.1 5.8 0 1.2 17.7
eur,chn,fsu** 0.8 2.8 1.5 1.2 11.0 0 1.1 17.3
jpn,eur,chn 0.8 2.8 1.7 1.4 5.5 0.1 1.1 17.2
jpn,eur,chn,fsu 0.8 2.4 1.5 1.5 11.7 0.1 1.2 17.1
jpn,chn** 0.8 2.3 2.0 0.3 4.6 0.1 1.0 17.0
jpn,chn,fsu** 0.7 1.8 1.9 0.5 5.9 0.1 1.0 16.6
usa,eur,chn 0.7 1.9 0.7 3.6 4.2 0.1 0.9 15.3
usa,jpn,eur,chn 0.6 1.8 0.6 3.7 4.0 0.2 0.9 14.9
usa,eur,chn,fsu 0.4 1.6 0.2 3.1 13.4 0.2 0.8 14.6
usa,jpn,eur,chn,fsu 0.5 1.2 0.2 3.5 14.3 0.3 0.9 14.6
usa,jpn,chn 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.6 0.2 0.7 14.3
chn,fsu* 0.4 1.4 1.1 0.1 1.8 0 0.5 14.2
usa,chn** 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.3 2.0 0.2 0.5 13.4
usa,jpn,chn,fsu 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.8 6.5 0.3 0.6 13.4
usa,chn,fsu 0 0.7 0.5 1.1 3.6 0.2 0.4 12.4
jpn,fsu 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 11.4
eur,fsu 0 0.1 -0.1 0 4.8 0.1 0.1 11.1
No-Trade Nash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.0
jpn,eur,fsu 0 0 -0.2 0 5.2 0.1 0.1 10.9
jpn,eur -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0 0 0.1 -0.1 10.3
usa,eur 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 10.2
usa,jpn -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 0 -1.0 0.1 -0.2 9.6
usa,eur,fsu -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.1 11.1 0.2 -0.1 9.5
usa,jpn,eur -0.1 0.1 -0.8 0 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 9.2
usa,jpn,eur,fsu -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 0 10.5 0.3 -0.2 9.0
usa,jpn,fsu -0.3 -1.2 -0.6 0 4.4 0.2 -0.2 9.0
usa,fsu -0.4 -0.9 -0.7 0 2.9 0.2 -0.3 8.8
* indicates that a coalition is a SPNE.
** indicates a SPNE coalition which satisﬁes the weak external stability condition.
% Equivalent Variation: % change in money-metric utility from no-trade Nash.
Emission Reduction: % reduction in global emissions from BaU.
Global %EV: global equivalent variation as % change from no-trade Nash
work which focuses on the role of imperfect competition and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity yields even
higher underlying implicit Armington elasticities (Rolleigh 2003).
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4.3 Participation of Developing Countries in Emission Abatement
A commonly held view is that the prospects for involving developing countries in emission abate-
ment will improve in the future when the environment becomes a higher social priority for them.
This perspective seems to be based on the idea that economic development acts as a catalyst for
environmental protection  as income rises, so does its interest in protecting the environment.
To analyze this, we now consider a scenario in which we have raised the marginal value of abate-
ment (1998, US-$ per ton of carbon) for chn from 0 to 50, and for fsu from 50 to 100 (values
for the other regions remain unchanged).
Table 5 summarizes the results of this experiment. The left side of the table reproduces the
outcome for the eur-chn-fsu agreement and the no-trade Nash equilibrium from Table 2. The
right side of the table presents the same simulations run using the alternative assumption about
the distribution of regional marginal willingness to pay.
Table 5: Coalitions by Emission Reduction and Welfare Change, 2015
High Developing-World MWTP (CHN = $50 per ton, FSU = $100 per ton)
Baseline High MWTP
Global Emission Global Emission
% EV Reduction % EV Reduction
eur,chn,fsu 1.0 14.0 0.4 14.7
No-Trade Nash 0 7.8 0 12.8
Emission Reduction: % reduction in global emissions from BaU.
Global %EV: global equivalent variation as % change from
no-trade Nash.
In comparison to the baseline scenario, abatement levels increase as a fraction of BaU emis-
sions. This reﬂects the fact that the global mean valuation of emission reductions is higher.
However, the diﬀerence between the most eﬀective coalitional outcome and the no-trade Nash
equilibrium is considerably lower under this scenario. Hence there are lower potential gains from
a permit trade agreement. The reason is that permit coalitions are driven by heterogeneity in
environmental values among member states, exploiting the associated diﬀerences in marginal
abatement cost that would arise without trading.
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It follows that involvement of developing countries in a permit trading system is more valuable
today than it will be in the future when their environmental valuation and abatement cost are
more similar to those of the other regions. The fact that developing countries stand to beneﬁt
substantially from the sale of permits in our model provides some hope that the prospects for a
timely involvement are better than it is often perceived.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study responds to three stylized observations regarding current eﬀorts to establish an in-
ternational global warming treaty. First, more than a decade of negotiations have demonstrated
the diﬃculty of establishing collective abatement agreements in which member countries are
required to substitute their national interests for the global good. The theoretical literature
on self-enforcing environmental agreements largely conﬁrms this experience. Second, in the near
term, most of the world's reductions in greenhouse gases will come at the cost of curbing demand
for fossil fuels. Because of the structure of international energy markets and the role that these
inputs play in many basic economic functions, determining the economic costs of abatement is a
general equilibrium problem. Third, the currency of policy negotiations is emission rights, and
a major subject of debate is the extent to which international trade in these rights should play
a role in the design of global warming treaties.
We explore the extent to which a system of internationally tradable emission permits might
enhance abatement, even if states are guided in their behavior by national self-interest. We also
evaluate the degree to which the structure of the world economy aﬀects these outcomes.
We ﬁnd that equilibrium agreements are capable of producing emission reductions that are
about half of the ﬁrst-best level. This is a striking result because members of a trading coalition
as well as outsiders adopt noncooperative best-reply strategies in their choices of permits and
emissions  the only diﬀerence between the second stage of our game and the standard Nash
equilibrium in emission levels is the extension of the action set to include permit endowments
and their subsequent trade on international permit markets.
Furthermore, a permit trading system proves to be quite successful in inducing members of
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the developing world to participate in carbon abatement. The best coalitions combine China,
which contributes its low abatement cost, with Europe, which has the highest valuation for
abatement and, therefore, acts as its main ﬁnancier by choosing a low permit endowment. This
supports the view that the Kyoto Protocol is ﬂawed in its failure to include developing countries
in a meaningful way. While this criticism is not new, it is typically focused on the failure to
impose binding targets for developing countries. Our analysis shows that the essential point is
not the subjection to such targets  developing countries are free to choose them unilaterally in
our framework  but the cheap abatement options that they contribute to a trading coalition.
There are several equilibrium coalitions, and we presume that an important role of the nego-
tiation process and of the institutions involved therein is to direct countries towards the selection
of the most eﬀective coalition. Our calculations indicate that coalitions (and global abatement)
may beneﬁt from excluding certain countries from membership. When countries choose permit
allocations noncooperatively, then the net eﬀect of adding a new country to the coalition may
be higher global emission levels.
Our results also highlight how the incentive to use environmental policy as a substitute
for trade policy contributes to the performance of environmental policies. This idea has long
been acknowledged in the theoretical literature on strategic trade and the environment but has
received almost no attention from researchers attempting to quantify the interactions between
trade and environmental policy. In some of our simulations, trade channels are more inﬂuential in
shaping equilibrium outcomes than the impulse to equate marginal abatement cost with marginal
damages. The extent to which the insights from our analysis can be applied to other policy
settings remains an open question.
A limitation of our analysis that we assume that only governments act strategically. A
valuable extension of the model would be to allow for imperfect competition on the permit
market (and, consistently, on the energy market). A standard way to do so would be to assume
that there is region with market power which is surrounded by a competitive fringe (Hahn 1984).
However, implementation of this idea is not trivial because the degree of market power depends
on the overall size of the permit market, which diﬀers across coalitions.
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